

~~TOP SECRET~~/ [REDACTED]

and March 2003. The General Counsel says that none of the participants expressed any concern about the techniques or the Program.

48. (TS [REDACTED]) On 29 July 2003, the DCI and the General Counsel provided a detailed briefing to selected NSC Principals on CIA's detention and interrogation efforts involving "high value detainees," to include the expanded use of EITs.<sup>28</sup> According to a Memorandum for the Record prepared by the General Counsel following that meeting, the Attorney General confirmed that DoJ approved of the expanded use of various EITs, including multiple applications of the waterboard.<sup>29</sup> The General Counsel said he believes everyone in attendance was aware of exactly what CIA was doing with respect to detention and interrogation, and approved of the effort. According to OGC, the senior officials were again briefed regarding the CTC Program on 16 September 2003, and the Intelligence Committee leadership was briefed again in September 2003. Again, according to OGC, none of those involved in these briefings expressed any reservations about the program.

*GUIDANCE ON CAPTURE, DETENTION, AND INTERROGATION*

49. (TS [REDACTED]) Guidance and training are fundamental to the success and integrity of any endeavor as operationally, politically, and legally complex as the Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program. Soon after 9/11, the DDO issued guidance on the standards for the capture of terrorist targets. [REDACTED]

50. (TS [REDACTED]) The DCI, in January 2003 approved formal "Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees" (Appendix D) and "Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted

<sup>28</sup> [REDACTED]

<sup>29</sup> (U//FOUO) Memorandum for the Record, [REDACTED] (5 August 2003).

~~TOP SECRET~~/ [REDACTED]

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

(Appendix E), which are discussed below. Prior

Headquarters, to the field.

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\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_



\_\_\_\_\_



[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

54.

[REDACTED]

55.

[REDACTED]


56.

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]




~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



#### DCI Confinement Guidelines

57. (TS [REDACTED]) Before January 2003, officers assigned to manage detention facilities developed and implemented confinement condition procedures. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The January 2003 DCI Guidelines govern the conditions of confinement for CIA detainees held in detention facilities [REDACTED]



31 [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



58. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] They must review the Guidelines and sign an acknowledgment that they have done so. [REDACTED]

59. (~~TS~~/ [REDACTED]) The DCI Guidelines specify legal "minimums" and require that "due provision must be taken to protect the health and safety of all CIA detainees." The Guidelines do not require that conditions of confinement at the detention facilities conform to U.S. prison or other standards. At a minimum, however, detention facilities are to provide basic levels of medical care:

[REDACTED]

Further, the guidelines provide that:

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~/ [REDACTED]

## DCI Interrogation Guidelines

60. ~~(S//NF)~~ Prior to January 2003, CTC and OGC disseminated guidance via cables, e-mail, or orally on a case-by-case basis to address requests to use specific interrogation techniques. Agency management did not require those involved in interrogations to sign an acknowledgement that they had read, understood, or agreed to comply with the guidance provided. Nor did the Agency maintain a comprehensive record of individuals who had been briefed on interrogation procedures.

61. ~~(TS)~~ [REDACTED]

The DCI

Interrogation Guidelines require that all personnel directly engaged in the interrogation of persons detained have reviewed these Guidelines, received appropriate training in their implementation, and have completed the applicable acknowledgement.

62. ~~(S//NF)~~ The DCI Interrogation Guidelines define "Permissible Interrogation Techniques" and specify that "unless otherwise approved by Headquarters, CIA officers and other personnel acting on behalf of CIA may use only Permissible Interrogation Techniques. Permissible Interrogation Techniques consist of both (a) Standard Techniques and (b) Enhanced

32 ~~(S//NF)~~ See [REDACTED] relevant text of DO Handbook [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~/ [REDACTED]

Techniques."<sup>33</sup> EITs require advance approval from Headquarters, as do standard techniques whenever feasible. The field must document the use of both standard techniques and EITs.

63. (~~TS~~, [REDACTED]) The DCI Interrogation Guidelines define "standard interrogation techniques" as techniques that do not incorporate significant physical or psychological pressure. These techniques include, but are not limited to, all lawful forms of questioning employed by U.S. law enforcement and military interrogation personnel. Among standard interrogation techniques are the use of isolation, sleep deprivation not to exceed 72 hours,<sup>34</sup> reduced caloric intake (so long as the amount is calculated to maintain the general health of the detainee), deprivation of reading material, use of loud music or white noise (at a decibel level calculated to avoid damage to the detainee's hearing), the use of diapers for limited periods (generally not to exceed 72 hours, [REDACTED] and moderate psychological pressure. The DCI Interrogation Guidelines do not specifically prohibit improvised actions. A CTC/Legal officer has said, however, that no one may employ any technique outside specifically identified standard techniques without Headquarters approval.

64. (~~TS~~, [REDACTED]) EITs include physical actions and are defined as "techniques that do incorporate physical or psychological pressure beyond Standard Techniques." Headquarters must approve the use of each specific EIT in advance. EITs may be employed only by trained and certified interrogators for use with a specific detainee and with appropriate medical and psychological monitoring of the process.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>33</sup> (~~TS~~) The 10 approved EITs are described in the textbox on page 15 of this Review.

<sup>34</sup> (~~TS~~, [REDACTED]) According to the General Counsel, in late December 2003, the period for sleep deprivation was reduced to 48 hours.

<sup>35</sup> (~~TS~~, [REDACTED]) Before EITs are administered, a detainee must receive a detailed psychological assessment and physical exam. [REDACTED]



## Medical Guidelines

65. (TS [REDACTED]) OMS prepared draft guidelines for medical and psychological support to detainee interrogations.

[REDACTED]

(Appendix F.)

## Training for Interrogations

66. (TS [REDACTED]) In November 2002, [REDACTED] initiated a pilot running of a two-week Interrogator Training Course designed to train, qualify, and certify individuals as Agency interrogators.<sup>37</sup> Several CTC officers,

<sup>36</sup> (U//AIUO) A 28 March 2003 Lotus Note from C/CTC/Legal advised Chief, Medical Services that the "Seventh Floor" "would need to approve the promulgation of any further formal guidelines. . . . For now, therefore, let's remain at the discussion stage. . . ."

<sup>37</sup> [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

including a former SERE instructor, designed the curriculum, which included a week of classroom instruction followed by a week of "hands-on" training in EITs. [REDACTED]

67. ~~(TS)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Once certified, an interrogator is deemed qualified to conduct an interrogation employing EITs. [REDACTED]

68. ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Students completing the Interrogation Course are required to sign an acknowledgment that they have read, understand, and will comply with the DCI's Interrogation Guidelines.

69. (TS [REDACTED]) In June 2003, CTC established a debriefing course for Agency substantive experts who are involved in questioning detainees after they have undergone interrogation and have been deemed "compliant." The debriefing course was established to train non-interrogators to collect actionable intelligence from high value detainees in CIA custody. The course is intended to familiarize non-interrogators with key aspects of the Agency interrogation Program, to include the Program's goals and legal authorities, the DCI Interrogation Guidelines, and the roles and responsibilities of all who interact with a high value detainee. [REDACTED]

*DETENTION AND INTERROGATION OPERATIONS AT* [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

70. [REDACTED]



~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

71.

[REDACTED]

72.

[REDACTED]

73.

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~/ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

74. (TS [REDACTED] psychologist/interrogators [REDACTED] led each interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and Al-Nashiri where EITs were used. The psychologist/interrogators conferred with [REDACTED] team members before each interrogation session. Psychological evaluations were performed by [REDACTED] psychologists. [REDACTED]

75. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

76. (TS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 15 November 2002. The interrogation of Al-Nashiri proceeded after [REDACTED] the necessary Headquarters authorization. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~/ [REDACTED]

psychologist/interrogators began Al-Nashiri's interrogation using EITs immediately upon his arrival. Al-Nashiri provided lead information on other terrorists during his first day of interrogation. On the twelfth day of interrogation, [REDACTED] psychologist/interrogators administered two applications of the waterboard to Al-Nashiri during two separate interrogation sessions. Enhanced interrogation of Al-Nashiri continued through 4 December 2002, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

### Videotapes of Interrogations

77. (TS [REDACTED]) Headquarters had intense interest in keeping abreast of all aspects of Abu Zubaydah's interrogation [REDACTED] including compliance with the guidance provided to the site relative to the use of EITs. Apart from this, however, and before the use of EITs, the interrogation teams [REDACTED] decided to videotape the interrogation sessions. One initial purpose was to ensure a record of Abu Zubaydah's medical condition and treatment should he succumb to his wounds and questions arise about the medical care provided to him by CIA. Another purpose was to assist in the preparation of the debriefing reports, although the team advised CTC/Legal that they rarely, if ever, were used for that purpose. There are 92 videotapes, 12 of which include EIT applications. An OGC attorney reviewed the videotapes in November and December 2002 to ascertain compliance with the August 2002 DOJ opinion and compare what actually happened with what was reported to Headquarters. He reported that there was no deviation from the DOJ guidance or the written record.

78. (TS [REDACTED]) OIG reviewed the videotapes, logs, and cables [REDACTED] in May 2003. OIG identified 83 waterboard applications, most of which lasted less than 10 seconds.<sup>41</sup> [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

<sup>41</sup> (TS [REDACTED]) For the purpose of this Review, a waterboard application constituted each discrete instance in which water was applied for any period of time during a session.



[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] OIG found 11 interrogation videotapes to be blank. Two others were blank except for one or two minutes of recording. Two others were broken and could not be reviewed. OIG compared the videotapes to [REDACTED] logs and cables and identified a 21-hour period of time, which included two waterboard sessions, that was not captured on the videotapes.

79. (TS [REDACTED]) OIG's review of the videotapes revealed that the waterboard technique employed at [REDACTED] was different from the technique as described in the DoJ opinion and used in the SERE training. The difference was in the manner in which the detainee's breathing was obstructed. At the SERE School and in the DoJ opinion, the subject's airflow is disrupted by the firm application of a damp cloth over the air passages; the interrogator applies a small amount of water to the cloth in a controlled manner. By contrast, the Agency interrogator [REDACTED] continuously applied large volumes of water to a cloth that covered the detainee's mouth and nose. One of the psychologists/interrogators acknowledged that the Agency's use of the technique differed from that used in SERE training and explained that the Agency's technique is different because it is "for real" and is more poignant and convincing.

[REDACTED]

80. (TS [REDACTED]) From December 2002 until [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] September 2003, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] During this time, Headquarters issued the formal DCI Confinement Guidelines, the DCI Interrogation Guidelines, and the additional draft guidelines specifically

~~TOP SECRET~~/ [REDACTED]

addressing requirements for OMS personnel. This served to strengthen the command and control exercised over the CTC Program.

#### Background and Detainees

81. [REDACTED]

82. [REDACTED]

83. [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~/ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~/

84.

85.

86.

87.

~~TOP SECRET~~/



88. [REDACTED]

### Guidance Prior to DCI Guidelines

89. (TS) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Agency was providing legal and operational briefings and cables [REDACTED] that contained Headquarters' guidance and discussed the torture statute and the DoJ legal opinion. CTC had also established a precedent of detailed cables between [REDACTED] and Headquarters regarding the interrogation and debriefing of detainees. The written guidance did not address the four standard interrogation techniques that, according to CTC/Legal, the Agency had identified as early as November 2002.<sup>43</sup> Agency personnel were authorized to employ standard interrogation techniques on a detainee without Headquarters' prior approval. The guidance did not specifically

<sup>43</sup> (S//NF) The four standard interrogation techniques were: (1) sleep deprivation not to exceed 72 hours, (2) continual use of light or darkness in a cell, (3) loud music, and (4) white noise (background hum).

address the use of props to imply a physical threat to a detainee, nor did it specifically address the issue of whether or not Agency officers could improvise with any other techniques. No formal mechanisms were in place to ensure that personnel going to the field were briefed on the existing legal and policy guidance.

### Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques

90. (TS [REDACTED]) This Review heard allegations of the use of unauthorized techniques [REDACTED]. The most significant, the handgun and power drill incident, discussed below, is the subject of a separate OIG investigation. In addition, individuals interviewed during the Review identified other techniques that caused concern because DoJ had not specifically approved them. These included the making of threats, blowing cigar smoke, employing certain stress positions, the use of a stiff brush on a detainee, and stepping on a detainee's ankle shackles. For all of the instances, the allegations were disputed or too ambiguous to reach any authoritative determination regarding the facts. Thus, although these allegations are illustrative of the nature of the concerns held by individuals associated with the CTC Program and the need for clear guidance, they did not warrant separate investigations or administrative action.

### Handgun and Power Drill

91. (TS [REDACTED]) [REDACTED] interrogation team members, whose purpose it was to interrogate Al-Nashiri and debrief Abu Zubaydah, initially staffed [REDACTED]. The interrogation team continued EITs on Al-Nashiri for two weeks in December 2002 [REDACTED] they assessed him to be "compliant." Subsequently, CTC officers at Headquarters [REDACTED] sent a [REDACTED] senior operations officer (the debriefer) [REDACTED] to debrief and assess Al-Nashiri.

92. (TS [REDACTED]) The debriefer assessed Al-Nashiri as withholding information, at which point [REDACTED] reinstated [REDACTED] hooding, and handcuffing. Sometime between [REDACTED]

28 December 2002 and 1 January 2003, the debriefer used an unloaded semi-automatic handgun as a prop to frighten Al-Nashiri into disclosing information.<sup>44</sup> After discussing this plan with [REDACTED] the debriefer entered the cell where Al-Nashiri sat shackled and racked the handgun once or twice close to Al-Nashiri's head.<sup>45</sup> On what was probably the same day, the debriefer used a power drill to frighten Al-Nashiri. With [REDACTED] consent, the debriefer entered the detainee's cell and revved the drill while the detainee stood naked and hooded. The debriefer did not touch Al-Nashiri with the power drill.

93. ~~(S//NF)~~ The [REDACTED] and debriefer did not request authorization or report the use of these unauthorized techniques to Headquarters. However, in January 2003, newly arrived TDY officers [REDACTED] who had learned of these incidents reported them to Headquarters. OIG investigated and referred its findings to the Criminal Division of DoJ. On 11 September 2003, DoJ declined to prosecute and turned these matters over to CIA for disposition. These incidents are the subject of a separate OIG Report of Investigation.<sup>46</sup>

### Threats

94. ~~(TS)~~ [REDACTED] During another incident [REDACTED] the same Headquarters debriefer, according to a [REDACTED] who was present, threatened Al-Nashiri by saying that if he did not talk, "We could get your mother in here," and, "We can bring your family in here." The [REDACTED] debriefer reportedly wanted Al-Nashiri to infer, for psychological reasons, that the debriefer might be [REDACTED] intelligence officer based on his Arabic dialect, and that Al-Nashiri was in [REDACTED] custody because it was widely believed in Middle East circles that [REDACTED] interrogation technique involves

<sup>44</sup> ~~(S//NF)~~ This individual was not a trained interrogator and was not authorized to use EITs.

<sup>45</sup> (U//FOUO) Racking is a mechanical procedure used with firearms to chamber a bullet or simulate a bullet being chambered.

<sup>46</sup> ~~(S//NF)~~ Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques [REDACTED] 29 October 2003.



~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

sexually abusing female relatives in front of the detainee. The debriefer denied threatening Al-Nashiri through his family. The debriefer also said he did not explain who he was or where he was from when talking with Al-Nashiri. The debriefer said he never said he was [REDACTED] intelligence officer but let Al-Nashiri draw his own conclusions.

95. (TS [REDACTED] An experienced Agency interrogator reported that the [REDACTED] interrogators threatened Khalid Shaykh Muhammad [REDACTED] According to this interrogator, the [REDACTED] interrogators said to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad that if anything else happens in the United States, "We're going to kill your children." According to the interrogator, one of the [REDACTED] interrogators said [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] With respect to the report provided to him of the threats [REDACTED] that report did not indicate that the law had been violated.

### Smoke

96. (TS [REDACTED] An Agency [REDACTED] interrogator admitted that, in December 2002, he and another [REDACTED] smoked cigars and blew smoke in Al-Nashiri's face during an interrogation. The interrogator claimed they did this to "cover the stench" in the room and to help keep the interrogators alert late at night. This interrogator said he would not do this again based on "perceived criticism." Another Agency interrogator admitted that he also smoked cigars during two sessions with Al-Nashiri to mask the stench in the room. He claimed he did not deliberately force smoke into Al-Nashiri's face.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

### Stress Positions

97. (TS [REDACTED]) OIG received reports that interrogation team members employed potentially injurious stress positions on Al-Nashiri. Al-Nashiri was required to kneel on the floor and lean back. On at least one occasion, an Agency officer reportedly pushed Al-Nashiri backward while he was in this stress position. On another occasion, [REDACTED] said he had to intercede after [REDACTED] expressed concern that Al-Nashiri's arms might be dislocated from his shoulders. [REDACTED] explained that, at the time, the interrogators were attempting to put Al-Nashiri in a standing stress position. Al-Nashiri was reportedly lifted off the floor by his arms while his arms were bound behind his back with a belt.

### Stiff Brush and Shackles

98. (TS [REDACTED]) interrogator reported that he witnessed other techniques used on Al-Nashiri that the interrogator knew were not specifically approved by DoJ. These included the use of a stiff brush that was intended to induce pain on Al-Nashiri and standing on Al-Nashiri's shackles, which resulted in cuts and bruises. When questioned, an interrogator who was at [REDACTED] acknowledged that they used a stiff brush to bathe Al-Nashiri. He described the brush as the kind of brush one uses in a bath to remove stubborn dirt. A CTC manager who had heard of the incident attributed the abrasions on Al-Nashiri's ankles to an Agency officer accidentally stepping on Al-Nashiri's shackles while repositioning him into a stress position.

### Waterboard Technique

99. (TS [REDACTED]) The Review determined that the interrogators used the waterboard on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad in a manner inconsistent with the SERE application of the waterboard and the description of the waterboard in the DoJ OLC opinion, in that the technique was used on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad a large number of times. According to the General Counsel, the Attorney

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

General acknowledged he is fully aware of the repetitive use of the waterboard and that CIA is well within the scope of the DoJ opinion and the authority given to CIA by that opinion. The Attorney General was informed the waterboard had been used 119 times on a single individual.

100. (TS [REDACTED]) Cables indicate that Agency interrogators [REDACTED] applied the waterboard technique to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad 183 [REDACTED]

47 [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] 46

101. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

102. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

48 ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] The OLC opinion dated 1 August 2002 states, "You have also orally informed us that it is likely that this procedure [waterboard] would not last more than 20 minutes in any one application." [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
103. [REDACTED]

104. [REDACTED]

105. [REDACTED]

106. [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
107. [REDACTED]

108. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
109. [REDACTED]

110. [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

111. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

112. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

50 [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

113. [REDACTED]

114. [REDACTED]

115. [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

116. [REDACTED]

117. [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

118. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

119. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

120. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

53 (TS) [REDACTED] The first session of the interrogation course began in November 2002. See paragraphs 64-65.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

121.

[REDACTED]

122.

[REDACTED]

Interrogators are required to sign a statement certifying they have read and understand the contents of the folder.

[REDACTED]

123.

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

124.

[REDACTED]

125.

[REDACTED]

126.

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

127.

[REDACTED]

128.

[REDACTED]

129.

[REDACTED]

54

[REDACTED]

55

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

130. [REDACTED]

131. [REDACTED]

132. [REDACTED]

133. [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

134. [REDACTED]

135. [REDACTED]

136. [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

137.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

138.

[REDACTED]

139.

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

140. [REDACTED]

141. [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

142.

[REDACTED]

143.

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

144.

145.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

146.

[REDACTED]

147.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



~~TOP SECRET~~

148.

149.

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152.



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~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

156.

157.

158.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

159.

[REDACTED]

160.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

161.

[REDACTED]

162.

[REDACTED]

163.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]