CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY — DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

3 June 2005

Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida

(S//NF)

the organizations until his arrest in July 2004, he has reported on how he forged passports and to whom he supplied them.

[REDACTED] also provided invaluable insights in [REDACTED] reports that have aided our analysis of al-Qa'ida's current organization, the personalities of its key members, and al-Qa'ida's decisionmaking process. His reporting has contributed to our understanding of the enemy, how al-Qa'ida members interact with each other, how they are organized, and what their personal networks are like.

• [REDACTED] In particular, he was able to give insight into [REDACTED] operations chief Abu Faraj al-Libi.

(S/ [REDACTED] NF)

Ahmed Khalfam Ghailani (a.k.a. Haytham al-Kini, a.k.a. Fupi) a Tanzanian al-Qa'ida member who was indicted for his role in the 1998 East Africa US Embassy bombings, has provided new insights into al-Qa'ida's skills and networks. As a facilitator and one of al-Qa'ida's top document forgers since the 11 September attacks, with access to individuals across

in confronting detainees to persuade them to talk about topics they would otherwise not reveal.

- For example, lists of names found on the computer ███████████—a key al-Qa'ida financial operative and facilitator for the 11 September attacks—seized in March 2003 represented al-Qa'ida members who were to receive funds. Debriefers questioned detainees extensively on the names to determine who they were and how important they were to the organization. The information ██████████████████████ ████████████ helped us to better understand al-Qa'ida's hierarchy, revenues, and expenditures, ████████████ as well as funds that were available to families.

- The same computer contained a list of e-mail addresses for individuals KSM helped deploy abroad who he hoped would execute operations; ███████████████████

- ████████████ also reported that ██████ trained the bombmakers responsible for the bombing of the US Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, in June 2002 and the assassination attempt against President Musharraf in early 2002. ████████

Illuminating Other Collection (S//NF)

Detainees have been particularly useful in sorting out the large volumes of documents and computer data seized in raids. Such information potentially can be used in legal proceedings ████████████ ████████ Some also can be used

Challenges of Detainee Reporting (S//NF)

Detainees, by virtue of their circumstances, have an adversarial relationship with their debriefers; they often try pass incomplete or intentionally misleading information, perhaps hoping that the volume of the reporting will make it difficult to sort out the truth. ████████ admitted outright that there were some topics— ████████████ —he would not discuss.

elaborated on his plan to crash commercial airlines into Heathrow Airport; he may have assumed that Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, who was captured in December 2002, had already divulged this plan. (S/███ NF)

Refusing To Budge on Certain Topics (S//NF)

We assess that each detainee very likely has information that he will not reveal ███████

Detainees' information must be corroborated using multiple sources of intelligence; uncorroborated information from detainees must be regarded with some degree of suspicion. Sometimes the detainee gives information he calculates—rightly or wrongly—that the debriefers already know.

• Uncharacteristic for most detainees, KSM almost immediately following his capture in March 2003

Appendix B: Detainee Reporting on al-Qa'ida (S//NF)

2004 HUMINT Reporting on Terrorism (S//

Total Reports: 19,707

**HUMINT Reporting
on al-Qa'ida 6,600**

2004 HUMINT Reporting on al-Qa'ida (S/

Total Reports: 6,600

**Detainee Reporting
on al-Qa'ida 3,800**

SECRET/

Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) is captured and reports that Majid Khan, one of his Pakistan operatives, who was also captured in March, delivered $50,000 to some of Hambali's operatives in December 2002.

Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)

March 2003

When confronted with KSM's information, Majid Khan acknowledges that he delivered the money to an operative named Zubair—a key lieutenant for Hambali▮ ▮hat information leads to Zubair's capture in June 2003.

Majid Khan

March 2003

Zubair reports that he worked directly for Hambali and provides fragmentary information on a passport used by Hambali

Zubair

June 2003

▮ we use the information provided by Zubair to capture Hambali's other key lieutenant, Bashir Bin Lap, a.k.a. Lillie, who provides the location of Hambali, leading to his capture.

Bashir Bin Lap, a.k.a. Lillie

August 2003

In debriefings, Hambali unwittingly provides 'Abd al-Hadi's location,

Hambali

August 2003

[After Hambali's arrest,] KSM is asked about prospective successor to Hambali. KSM identifies Hambali's brother, 'Abd el-Hadi, a.k.a. Rusman 'Gun Gun' Gunawan.

'Abd al-Hadi identifies to us a cell of JI operatives whom Hambali had sent to Karachi for training. When confronted with his brother's revelations, Hambali admits that he was grooming members of the cell for US operations—at the behest of KSM—probably as part of KSM's plot to fly hijacked planes into the tallest building on the US west coast.

'Abd al-Hadi

September 2003

Bringing the story full circle. In September 2003, Pakistan authorities take down 14 members of the cell.

September 2003

**Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War
Against Al-Qa'ida (S//NF)**

Key Findings (U)

Since 11 September 2001, detainee reporting has become a crucial pillar of US counterterrorism efforts, aiding intelligence and law enforcement operations to capture additional terrorists, helping to thwart terrorist plots, and advancing our analysis of the al-Qa'ida target. In addition, detainees have been able to clarify and provide context for information collected from other sources; they also have provided unique insights into different aspects of the terrorist organization, including its leadership, attack strategy and tactics, and CBRN capabilities and ambitions. ▮▮▮▮ ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ the reporting is disseminated broadly within the US Government ▮▮▮▮▮▮ (S// ▮▮▮ NF)

Detainees have given us a wealth of useful ▮▮▮▮ information on al-Qa'ida members and associates; in fact, detainees have played some role ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ in nearly every capture of al-Qa'ida members and associates since 2002, including helping us unravel most of the network associated with the now detained 11 September mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM). KSM provided information that set the stage for the detention of Hambali, lead contact of Jemaah Islamiya (JI) to al-Qa'ida, and most of his network.

- Detainee information was also key to wrapping up such important al-Qa'ida members and associates as ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ Jose Padilla and Iyman Faris. (S// ▮▮▮ NF)

One of the gains to detaining the additional terrorists has been the thwarting of a number of al-Qa'ida operations in the United States and overseas. Jose Padilla was detained as he was arriving in Chicago with plans to mount an attack. Similarly, Walid Bin 'Attash (a.k.a. Khallad) was captured on the verge of mounting attacks against the US Consulate in Karachi, Westerners at the Karachi Airport, and Western housing areas. (S//NF)

Since 11 September, the capture and debriefing of detainees also has transformed our understanding of al-Qa'ida and affiliated terrorist groups,

providing increased avenues for sophisticated analysis. Before the capture of Abu Zubaydah in March 2002, ████████████████████████████ ██ ██████████████████████████████████ Within months of his arrest, Abu Zubaydah provided details about al-Qa'ida's organizational structure, key operatives, and modus operandi. It also was Abu Zubaydah, early in his detention, who identified KSM as the mastermind of the 11 September attacks.

- In the nearly four years since 11 September 2001, successive detainees have helped us gauge our progress in the fight against al-Qa'ida by providing updated information on the changing structure and health of the organization. ███████████████████ (S/ ███ NF)

Despite the unquestionable utility of detainee reporting, uncorroborated information from detainees must be regarded with some degree of suspicion. Detainees have been known to pass incomplete or intentionally misleading information; moreover, we assess that each detainee very likely has information that he will not reveal. ██████████████ ██

- ██ ████████████████████████████ (S/ ███ NF)

Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida (S//NF)

███████

Since 11 September 2001, reporting from high value al-Qa'ida detainees has become a crucial pillar of US counterterrorism efforts, contributing directly and indirectly to intelligence and law-enforcement operations against the al-Qa'ida target. In addition, detainees have been able to clarify and provide context for information collected from other sources; they also have provided unique insights into different aspects of the terrorist organization, including its leadership, attack strategy and tactics, and CBRN capabilities and ambitions.

- **High Value Detainee (HVD):** A detainee who—in large part due to his having held a position in or in association with al-Qa'ida before detention that afforded him significant information about the group—has advanced our understanding of terrorism on multiple fronts.

- **Medium Value Detainee (MVD):** A detainee whose reporting advanced our knowledge of al-Qa'ida, but only on a limited range of issues.

- **Low Value Detainee (LVD):** A detainee who may have provided some information on a specific issue, but whose overall reporting has not advanced our knowledge of al-Qa'ida. (S//NF)

Helping Target Other Terrorists (S//NF)

High and medium value detainees have given us a wealth of useful ███████ information on al-Qa'ida members and associates, including new details on the personalities and activities of known terrorists. Detainees also divulge, either wittingly or unwittingly, details about terrorists who are unknown to us. As is information from other collection streams, detainee reporting is often incomplete or too general to lead directly to arrests; instead, detainees provide critical pieces to the puzzle, which, when combined with other reporting, have helped direct an investigation's focus and led to the capture of terrorists.

- Detainee reporting since early 2003 has been a major foundation for much of the Intelligence Community's analysis on al-Qa'ida, both in terms of current intelligence publications and of more in-depth intelligence assessments.

- ███████ detainee reporting is disseminated broadly among US intelligence and law-enforcement entities ███████ (S/ ███████ NF)

Defining al-Qa'ida Detainees (S//NF)

Detained members and associates of al-Qa'ida fall into three basic categories, based on their position and access and the reporting they have provided.

███████

This assessment was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist Center's Office of Terrorism Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, ███████

███████

Unraveling Hambali's Network

In March 2003, al-Qa'ida external operations chief Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) provided information about an al-Qa'ida operative, Majid Khan, who he was aware had recently been captured. KSM—possibly believing the detained operative was "talking"—admitted to having tasked Majid with delivering a large sum of money to individuals working for another senior al-Qa'ida associate.

- In an example of how information from one detainee can be used in debriefing another detainee in a "building block" process, Khan—confronted with KSM's information about the money— acknowledged that he delivered the money to an operative named "Zubair" and provided Zubair's physical description and contact number. Based on that information, Zubair was captured in June 2003.

- During debriefings, Zubair revealed that he worked directly for Hambali, who was the principle Jemaah Islamiya (JI) conduit to al-Qa'ida. Zubair provided information ███████████████████ ████████████████████ we used the information Zubair provided to track down and arrest Hambali.

- Next, KSM—when explicitly queried on the issue—identified Hambali's brother, 'Abd al-Hadi (a.k.a. Rusman Gunawan) as a prospective successor to Hambali. ████████████████

- Bringing the story full circle, 'Abd al-Hadi identified a cell of JI operatives whom Hambali had sent to Karachi for training. When confronted with his brother's revelations, Hambali admitted that some members of the cell were eventually to be groomed for US operations—at the behest of KSM—possibly as part of KSM's plot to fly hijacked planes into the tallest building on the US west coast.[1] (S/███████NF)

Bringing New Targets to Light

A variety of detainee reporting has provided us initial information about individuals having links to al-Qa'ida and has given us insight into individuals about whom we had some reporting but whose

---

[1] See Appendix A: Capture of Al-Qa'ida's Southeast Asian Chief Hambali (S/NF). (S/NF)

al-Qa'ida involvement was unclear. For example, detainees in mid-2003 helped us build a list of approximately 70 individuals—many of whom we had never heard of before—that al-Qa'ida deemed suitable for Western operations.

███████████████ that was key to uncovering Ja'far's true name. (S//███NF)

Aiding US Law Enforcement Efforts (S//NF)

Many actionable leads provided by detainee reporting have assisted the efforts of the FBI, local law enforcement, and the Department of Defense. Such information has led to arrests, helped in questioning suspects, and may ultimately be used in a judicial process. (S/███NF)

Soon after his arrest, KSM described an Ohio-based truck driver whom the FBI identified as **Iyman Faris**, and who was already under suspicion for his contacts with al-Qa'ida operative Majid Khan. The FBI and CIA shared intelligence from interviews of KSM, Khan, and Faris on a near real-time basis and quickly ascertained that Faris had met and accepted operational taskings from KSM on several occasions. Faris is currently serving a 20-year sentence for conspiracy and material support to a terrorist organization. (S/███NF)

KSM's revelation in March 2003 that he was plotting with **Sayf al-Rahman Paracha**—who also used the name Saifullah al-Rahman Paracha—to smuggle explosives into the United States for a planned attack in New York prompted the FBI to investigate Paracha's business ties in the United States. The investigation also involved questioning Paracha's son, Uzair Paracha, in New York and resulted in designating in May 2003 Sayf al-Rahman Paracha an enemy combatant. Sayf al-Rahman Paracha entered into US custody in July 2003, and Uzair was indicted in the Federal Court in Manhattan. Sayf al-Rahman Paracha remains in detention at Guantanamo Bay. (S/███NF)

- **Ja'far al-Tayyar** first came to the FBI's attention when Abu Zubaydah named him as one of the most likely individuals to be used by al-Qa'ida for operations in the United States or Europe. ███ provided additional details.

Revealing Plots, Potential Targets (S//NF)

Detainee reporting has helped thwart a number of al-Qa'ida plots to attack targets in the West and elsewhere. Not only have detainees reported on potential targets and techniques that al-Qa'ida operational planners have considered but arrests also have disrupted attack plans in progress.

██████

In response to questions about al-Qa'ida's efforts to acquire WMD, KSM also revealed he had met three individuals involved in al-Qa'ida's program to produce anthrax. He apparently calculated—incorrectly—that we had this information already, given that one of the three—JI operative and al-Qa'ida associate Yazid Sufaat—had been in foreign custody ██████ for unrelated terrorist activity.

- After being confronted with KSM's reporting, Sufaat eventually admitted his principal role in the anthrax program and provided ██████ information on his at-large assistants. Ultimately, the information from Sufaat and KSM ██████ ██████ ed to the capture of Sufaat's two assistants in the anthrax program. (S/ ██████ NF)

US Targets Here and Abroad
Abu Zubaydah was the first of several detainees to reveal a significant quantity of general threat information against targets abroad and in the United States—including the White House and other US symbols.

- Reporting from Abu Zubaydah has been used as a baseline for debriefing other senior detainees ██████ ██████ probable targets and methods for attacks ██████ (S/ ██████ NF)

Debriefings of mid-level al-Qa'ida operatives also have reported on specific plots against US interests.

- A key Somali operative working with al-Qa'ida and al-Ittihad al-Islami in East Africa, Hassan Ahmed Guleed ██████ soon after his capture ██████ that East African al-Qa'ida leader ██████ planned to attack the US military at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti using explosive-laden water tankers.

██████

██████

Heathrow Airport Plot
Shortly after his capture in March 2003, KSM divulged limited information about his plot to use commercial airliners to attack Heathrow Airport and other targets in the United Kingdom. He discussed the plot probably because he suspected that key al-Qa'ida 11 September facilitator and Heathrow Airport plotter Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, who had been detained six months previously, had already revealed the information.

- Debriefers used KSM's and Bin al-Shibh's reporting to confront Walid Bin 'Attash (a.k.a. Khallad) and Ammar al-Baluchi, who were caught two months after KSM. Khallad admitted to having been involved in the plot and revealed that he had directed cell leader ██████ to begin locating pilots who could hijack planes and crash them into the airport. Khallad said he and operative ██████ had considered some 10 countries as possible launch sites for the hijacking attempts and that they narrowed the options to the ██████

- Khallad's statements provided leverage in debriefings of KSM. KSM fleshed out the status of the operation, including identifying an additional target in the United Kingdom— ███████ (S// ███████ NF)

Revealing the Karachi Plots
When confronted with information provided by Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad admitted during debriefings that al-Qa'ida was planning to attack the US Consulate in Karachi. ███████ (S/ ███████ NF)

Aiding Our Understanding of Al-Qa'ida (S//NF)

Since 11 September, the capture and debriefing of HVDs has significantly advanced our understanding of al-Qa'ida and affiliated terrorist groups. Before the capture of Abu Zubaydah in March 2002, we had significant gaps in knowledge about al-Qa'ida's organizational structure, key members and associates, capabilities, ███████ and its presence around the globe. Within months of his arrest, Abu Zubaydah provided details about al-Qa'ida's organizational structure, key operatives, and *modus operandi*. Early in his detention, his information on al-Qa'ida's *Shura* Council and its various committees added to what we were learning ███████

- In addition, Abu Zubaydah's identification early in his detention of KSM as the mastermind of 11 September and al-Qa'ida's premier terrorist planner and of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri as another key al-Qa'ida operational planner corroborated information ███████ (S// ███████ NF)

Since 11 September, successive detainees have helped us gauge our progress in the fight against al-Qa'ida by providing updated information on the changing structure and health of the organization